By Serie McDougal III, Temple University
America’s technological, military, and economic security is growing increasingly
vulnerable because of a lack of energy security. As a result, America’s
need to locate, exploit, and control fuel resources has intensified its engagement
of the African continent. The nature of America’s relationship with the
African continent is being progressively guided by U.S. energy policy.
Moreover, this relationship must be analyzed in light of the continuing legacy
of European colonialism on the African continent. There is a need to ensure
that the majority of African people benefit from activity in Africa’s energy
sector on a just and sustained basis. Fulfilling this need will require the adoption
of a foreign policy that is reflective of Africa’s unifying cultural beliefs
and values, holds foreign countries and companies who would do business
with Africa to a set of standards that disallows Africa’s exploitation, and is
aligned with African development on African terms.
Keywords: crude; refining; foreign policy
We lost the quick suspiciousness of the deprived, gained unwisely
generous reflexes, grew able to give without having to worry about
receiving, became accustomed to producing without taking thought
of the future depredations of destroyers. As yet this fateful generosity
disturbed no one—there was no hardship. A fertile softness enfolded
all our life. Ease, the knowledge tomorrow would sing as sweetly as
the present day, made all willing to forget the past, to ignore the
future. Past and future, neither weighed heavily upon our mind.
The growth of the American political and industrial economy, and the
maintenance of Western hegemony, is becoming increasingly dependent on
foreign sources of mineral resources that are critical to America’s technological
competitiveness, economic security, manufacture of goods, and
defense industry. Because these minerals are so vital, they are considered
critical materials (Klare, 2001). The location of these critical materials is
becoming the guiding principle behind the implementation of America’s
policy initiatives the world over. One of these critical materials is crude oil.
The global level of oil demand is rising at a rate of 2% per year, and the rate
of new discoveries is annually decreasing. However, the world’s energy
resources are far from equally consumed. The United States (4.6% of the
world’s population) consumes 25% of the world’s energy resources. Nearly
60% of the United States’s crude oil is imported from foreign sources. The
United States has reacted in part by increasingly tapping into the energy
resources of Africa. As a result, Africa is occupying a growing position in
the international political agenda of the West. The African continent risks
becoming increasingly necessary to the sustenance of White supremacy and
Western imperialism.
The National Energy Policy Development Group was commissioned by
President George W. Bush in 2001; the purpose of this group was to design
a detailed plan to deal with America’s growing dependency on foreign
sources of energy. Vice President Dick Cheney was selected to lead the
group, which produced a report called the National Energy Policy (NEP).
The report stated, “Along with Latin America, West Africa is expected to be
one of the fastest growing sources of oil and gas for the American market.
African oil tends to be of high quality and low in sulfur, making it suitable
for stringent refined product requirements, and giving it growing market
shares for refining centers on the east coast of the U.S.” (National Energy
Policy Development Group [NEPDG], 2001).
Why Africa?
The Persian Gulf will continue to be the United States’s primary source of
foreign oil despite political conflict in the region. However, by diversifying
its oil assets the United States intends to reduce its dependency on the Middle
East, which contains 68% of the world’s proven oil reserves (Ellis, 2003).
The American conflict with Iran over uranium enrichment, Israel’s land
occupation, war in Iraq, and discontent with America’s military presence
throughout the region makes the Middle East an area of political instability.
For the West, Africa is a necessary alternative. According to the U.S.
National Energy Policy, “Concentration of world oil production in any one
region of the world is a potential contributor to market instability”
(NEPDG, 2001, p. 132). Diversifying American oil imports away from the
Middle East serves the purpose of lessening the impact of potential supply
interruptions that may result from political instability in the Middle East.
South America possesses substantial portions of the world’s proven oil
reserves. However, the increasing liberalization of its governments has
proven problematic to large foreign oil producers. Countries like Bolivia
and Venezuela (the world’s fifth largest oil producer) are increasingly
nationalizing and extending state control over their oil assets. On May 1,
2006, Bolivia abruptly nationalized the nation’s gas fields. In other cases,
they are forcing foreign oil companies to pay higher taxes and higher fines
for spills, and issuing smaller shares of oil revenue (Shifter, 2006).
Although Columbia possesses substantial oil reserves, the fact that foreign
investors depend on oil pipelines to the sea presents a problem. Columbia’s
Occidental Petroleum pipeline alone has endured more than 900 bombings
from rebel groups since the 1980s (Furero, 2002). As a result of the aforementioned
challenges, Columbia would require millions of dollars in counterinsurgency
provisions and funding. Significant oil reserves have been
found in the Caspian Sea region as well; however, transporting the oil to
foreign markets would require extensive pipeline politics and security.
Energy from Africa plays an increasingly important role in our energy security.
Spencer Abraham, in a speech to the House International Relations
Committee (Dao, 2002)
The UN Conference on Trade and Development estimates that African
oil reserves hold approximately 80 billion barrels, or 8% of the world’s
crude reserves. During the last 10 years, Africa’s oil production levels have
increased by 36%, whereas the rest of the world’s production levels have
increased by only 16% (Servant, 2003). The Department of Energy estimates
that “the combined oil output by all African producers is projected to
rise by 91% between 2002 and 2025, from 8.6 to 16.4 million barrels per
day” (Klare & Volman, 2006, p. 611). Africa is also one of the only places
in the world where the rate of oil output (91%) is actually increasing at a
higher rate than oil consumption (35%) (Klare, 2004). Africa currently supplies
15% of America’s oil imports, and the U.S. National Intelligence
Council expects U.S. oil imports from Africa to increase to 25% by 2015
McDougal / African Fuel Minerals 3
(NEPDG, 2001). According to the Energy Information Administration
(2006) of the Department of Energy, the United States expects to be importing
770 million barrels of African oil per year in 2020. Africa’s oil is also
attractive because it tends to be “sweet”—or low in hydrogen sulfide and
carbon dioxide—making it easier and cheaper to refine (Klare & Volman,
2006).
Of particular interest in Africa is the oil located in the countries that border
the Gulf of Guinea and the oil located offshore in the Gulf itself. The
Gulf of Guinea is estimated to hold 24 billion barrels of oil, making it one
of the most productive offshore oil production centers in the world
(Servant, 2003). The oil located offshore is of particular interest because it
is not yet fully developed and is somewhat insulated from political turmoil
on the mainland. The offshore oil in the Gulf of Guinea is also attractive to
American markets and production firms because it does not have to pass
through major choke points or high-risk security areas such as the Straits of
Hormuz, the Strait of Gibraltar, the Strait of Malacca, or any other narrow
canals on its way from the Gulf of Guinea across the Atlantic Ocean to
refinement companies on the eastern seaboard of the United States.
West Africa offers political advantages to those countries that do not
consume oil from members of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) in that neither of its oil-producing countries belongs to
OPEC outside of Nigeria (Servant, 2003). The Wall Street Journal predicts
that West Africa will become the largest oil-producing region outside of
OPEC by 2010 (Klare & Volman, 2006). Moreover, securing oil investments
in the Gulf of Guinea is politically strategic for the United States
because it is very much aware of the competition it faces from the growing
energy needs of India, Malaysia, North Korea, South Korea, and the
energy-hungry industry of China. Securing oil resources in Africa represents
a response to the competition the United States faces from China. It
is important to note that “trade between China and Africa has been increasing
at 30% a year and is expected to top $50 billion this year [2006] up from
$39.7 billion in 2005” (Batson, 2006).
Five countries in particular are attracting an increasing amount of attention
in the Gulf of Guinea region: Nigeria, Angola, the Congo Brazzaville,
Equatorial Guinea, and Gabon. Nigeria is currently Africa’s largest supplier
of oil to the United States, supplying 10% of U.S. foreign oil. Nigeria has
received more than $350 billion in oil revenue over the past 40 years, yet
70% of its population lives on less than $1 per day. In fact, the level of
poverty in the oil-producing Niger Delta region is higher than the national
average.
Risk Assessment
What is wrong with oil? It has the most potential of all the minerals to
provoke crisis, conflict, and violence (Klare, 2004). However, the crisis
related to oil cannot be blamed on oil itself. Terry Karl of Stanford
University states, “Oil in itself means nothing. It is just a black viscous
liquid. What matters are the social and political and economic institutions
in which it is inserted. Oil can be a force for development or it can be a
major impetus for war” (2002, p. 15). Additionally, according to studies
conducted by the World Bank, “Of the 36 countries buffeted by conflicts,
27 countries are dependent on mineral exports. . . . Moreover, evidence
shows that reliance on oil and minerals negatively correlates with lack of
national ingenuity and social resourcefulness, essential components of
development” (Yohannes, 2002, p. 21). Using statistical analysis from 113
states between 1971 and 1997, Ross concluded that a state’s “reliance on
either oil or mineral exports tends to make it less democratic; that this
effect is not caused by other types of primary exports; that it is not limited
to the Arabian Peninsula, to the Middle East, or Sub-Saharan Africa;
and that it is not limited to small states” (2006, p. 346).
The question we must ask is: Just how dependent on crude oil exports
are the oil-producing African countries of the Gulf of Guinea? Oil accounts
for 95% of Nigeria’s government revenue; 85% of Angola’s government
revenue; 81% of Equatorial Guinea’s government revenue; 60% of Gabon’s
government revenue, and 60% of Congo Brazzaville’s government revenue.
Nothing human happens outside of the realm of culture.
Nobles, 2006
Recent social political circumstances alone fail to account for the
deeply rooted European legacy of colonialism, imperialism, and White
supremacy on the African continent against people of African descent. The
basic ethos of the European worldview that characterizes the historical
position that Western countries have occupied in relation to Africa is based
on the values of mastery over nature, materialism, conflict, aggression, and
the accumulation of resources at all costs (Kambon, 1998). The current
disproportionate material consumption, waste production, and military
dominance of Western countries over non-Western countries are products of
culturally based and historically rooted patterns of behavior and ideology
coming out of the West.
McDougal / African Fuel Minerals 5
White supremacy is the social, structural, and systemic exercise of power
against non-White people defined as inferior, and the consequential perpetuation
of European domination. With regard to Western oil companies,
White supremacy has manifested itself already in the forms of excessive oil
spills and pollution, lack of cleanup, provision of arms to armies and private
militaries to violently suppress local populations, destruction of fishing
communities and agriculturally dependent families, sustaining corrupt
leaders, and collusion with corrupt leaders (Cue, 2006; Silverstein, 2002;
Yohannes, 2002).
The battlefield is everywhere.
Paul Robeson
Humanitarianism must be seen in light of the evolving nature of domination.
Paul Robeson’s famous statement regarding the omnipresent nature
of warfare did not exclude that which takes place under the auspices of
humanitarianism, poverty reduction, and “development.” For instance, as
Klare and Volman state:
The largest portions of U.S. aid to Africa are being directed to Angola and
Nigeria, the two leading African oil suppliers to the U.S.A. The total security
aid to these two countries in Fiscal Years 2004–06 amounted to some $180
million, a substantial increase over the previous three-year period. In Fiscal
Year (FY) 2004 they also became eligible to receive surplus U.S. arms under
the Pentagon’s Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program. (2006, p. 617)
It is certain that U.S. humanitarian aid is following the geographical
location of fuel minerals in the Gulf of Guinea. In addition, it is plausible
that this humanitarian aid is being used as a means to gain political and
commercial favor in certain African countries. Other methods—such as
debt relief—may be used as a bargaining chip or an incentive offered to
African countries to compel them to accept and comply with American
fuel-driven commercial interests in the Gulf of Guinea. The evolving
nature of domination suggests that African people must realize that warfare
amounts to all methods used to get a people to accept and submit to
the will and interests of another country or a foreign group (Liang &
Xiangsui, 1999).
The Chad Model of Domination
European countries and economic institutions are trying creative new
methods of cooperation in their mission to tighten their grip on the energy
sector of African countries. An example is the degree of foreign control being
exercised over the economy and energy sector of Chad as a result of the
Chad-Cameroon Petroleum Revenue Management Program (PRMP). The
World Bank calls this program the model oil-management program to be
used for future generations in so-called “developing countries,” and Chad
represents the first experiment with this program. This program was designed
by the World Bank to control the oil revenue from the $3.5 billion Chad-
Cameroon Pipeline Project. The stated goal of the project is to make sure that the majority of oil revenue goes to priority areas of infrastructure and to guard
against misappropriation of oil revenue. Under this program, Exxon Mobil—
an American oil company and the largest oil company in the world—has been
chosen to manage most of the oil production (40%) and infrastructure
projects, along with Chevron Texaco and the Malaysian oil company Petronas,
who will together manage the remaining 60% of the oil production.
Twelve percent of the direct oil revenue from the pipeline project goes to
Chad, but first it goes into a Citibank account in London; from there, the
money is divided four ways. Ten percent of the proceeds from Chad’s share
of the oil revenue goes to the Future Generations Fund (FGF), which accumulates
oil revenue to be spent when oil resources dry up. In addition, 72%
will be earmarked for critical infrastructure areas: education, health care, social services, and rural development (the World Bank and Exxon Mobil
decide what private companies get contracts to do the construction and
provide the services); 4.5% goes to community-driven projects in the actual
oil-producing region; and 13.5% goes directly to the general budget of the
government. Chadian President Idris Deby eventually responded to what he
perceived to be an unfair distribution by passing a law that amended the
PRMP by eliminating the FGF, earmarking oil revenue for security and purchase
of arms, and doubling the money that goes to the federal government’s
general budget (England, 2006). The World Bank, Exxon, and Citibank
responded by freezing Chadian oil revenue in a Citibank escrow account.
Additionally, the World Bank cut off loan money to Chad, which blocked
other international financial institutions from participating with Chad because
many of them look to the World Bank before investing in international
projects. This demonstrates how interlocking, multinational European-led
institutions, governments, and corporations are consolidating their powers to
enhance their ability to coerce, manipulate, and control the direction of the
McDougal /
African Fuel Minerals 7
foreign and domestic policies in African countries and to secure a central
position in the energy sectors of oil-producing African countries.
Africa has much to gain through creating healthy commercial relationships
from its natural resources; however, considering the nature of Western
countries’ social and political zeitgeist and their institutions’ historic and
contemporary track record with the African continent, Africa has much to
lose in a commercial relationship with the United States that is based primarily
on oil, including:
• lower environmental standards, destruction of biodiversity, illegal waste
dumping, and water contamination;
• internal conflict and violence because of unequal distribution of oil revenue,
leading to overreliance on military force;
• increased presence of U.S. military throughout the region (evidenced by
the recent establishment of AFRICOM, a unique U.S. military command
that oversees strategic military operations in Africa;
• high-level governmental corruption;
• the possibility of becoming a future battleground for economic, political,
and possibly military forms of warfare between non-African countries
competing with one another over critical resources in Africa;
• diminished economic independence because of government revenue and
hazardous dependence on the stability of foreign markets and geopolitical
climates;
• inheriting the enemies of the United States who may want to hurt America
by attacking its interests in Africa;
• underdevelopment of Africa’s own relationships with its regional neighbors
because of the influence of foreign markets;
• failure to cultivate domestic and indigenous human capital because of
overreliance on oil revenue;
• increased susceptibility to the dictates and possible sanctioning power
and manipulation of the United States.
An African Foreign Policy
Let us not engage the world hurriedly. Let us not grasp at the rope of wealth
impatiently. That which should be treated with mature judgment, let us not
deal with in a state of uncontrolled passion. When we arrive at a cool place,
let us rest fully. Let us give continuous thought to the future. Let us give deepconsideration to the consequences of things. And this is because of our eventual
passing.
Teaching of Ifa (Karenga, 1999)
8
The teachings of Ifa provide a model that African countries in the Gulf
of Guinea can use to decide on a culturally centered political response to
the Western pursuit of their mineral resources. In this case, “African foreign
policy” refers to a strategy developed by African countries that prioritizes
the most critical needs of African people and the objectives of African
Nations with respect to Africa’s relationships with foreign countries, done
within the parameters of Africa’s most traditional principals of communalism,
harmony with nature, respect, and honor for ancestors and traditions.
Such a policy would free African countries from becoming an appendage to
any other political agenda that would require Africa to go about achieving
growth and development solely by making itself necessary to a foreign
power. It would allow African countries a framework through which they
could engage non-African countries.
Here I would like to introduce several policy initiatives that may be more
beneficial to African communities in the long term. African countries could
consider providing tax incentives or tax breaks for African-owned oil
exploration, production, and refinement companies, and making long-term
investments on downstream refinement technology, so that Africa itself can
get the most out of its resources.
Investing in refinement would also cut the
costs of purchasing so many refined petroleum products from Western
countries. African countries could encourage regional cooperation ad
trade by improving waterways, railways, and highways that connect cuntries
within Africa to better facilitate intra-African trade, joint development
projects between the best of Africa’s growing companies, and Africa meeting
its own needs. This would also increase the ability of people in the hinterlan
to benefit from goods and services that are available in the urban
and coastal regions.
The African Union (AU) could require member countries to earmark a
minimum percentage of oil revenue for infrastructure projects such a health
care, education, and social welfare. The AU Energy Committee shoud
require member countries to mandate oil-exploring companies to abde by the
cultural traditions and customs of local oil-yielding communities. In addition,
the AU Energy Committee should develop its own transparency initiative
demanding public disclosure of all profits and expenditures in the energy sectors
for member countries; the AU could send its own experts to a region to
investigate corruption. The AU Energy Committee could develop standard
labor and environmental standards for the production and exploration of
resources and the production of refined petroleum goods on the African continent.
The committee could also develop strict fines and penalties for the
McDougal / African Fuel Minerals 9
violation of those standards. In the case of repeated violation, the AU should also consider, for example, sharply reducing or canceling the flow of oil to
certain companies or countries with excessive violations or policies that
threaten the humanity or national sovereignty of Africa as a possible method
of retaliation or sanction. These measures would centralize the needs of
African people, representing a movement toward a more Afrocentric form of
political prioritization (Asante, 1998).
References
References
Asante, M. K. (1998, November 6). The Afrocentric idea. Philadelphia: Temple University
Press.
Batson, A. (2006). China and Africa strengthen ties with $1.9 billion in deals. The New York
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Chinweizu. (1975). The west and the rest of us: White predators, Black slavers, and the African
elite. New York: Random House.
Cue, E. (2006, September 25). Dictator and diplomat. U.S. News & World Report, 37–41.
Dao, J. (2002, September 19). In quietly courting Africa, U.S. likes the dowry: Oil. The
New York Times, p. A1.
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England, A. (2006, August 28). President tells oil companies to leave Chad. Financial
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Liang, Q., & Xiangsui, W. (1999). Unrestricted warfare. Beijing, China: PLA Literature and
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Nobles, W. (2006). Seeking the Sakhu. Chicago: Third World Press.
Ross, M. L. (2006). Does oil hinder democracy? World Politics 53(3), 325–361.
Servant, J.-C. (2003, March). The new gulf oil states. Review of African Political Economy,
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Shifter, M. (2006, May/June). In search of Hugo Chavez. Foreign Affairs, 45–59.
10 Journal of Black Studies
Silverstein, K. (2002). U.S. oil politics in the Kuwait of Africa. The Nation. Retrieved January
15, 2007, from www.thenation.com/docprint.mhtml?i=20020422&s=silverstein
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33(2), 2–21.
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Serie McDougal III is a PhD candidate in the African American Studies Department at
Temple University in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Mr. McDougal has attained an undergraduate
degree in sociology from Loras College in Dubuque, Iowa, and an MA in Africana
Studies from the State University of New York at Albany.
McDougal / African Fuel Minerals 11
Throughout history, it has been the inaction of those who could have acted, the indifference of those who should have known better, the silence of the voice of justice when it mattered most, that has made it possible for evil to triumph. 
